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June 2010
WANTED:
A STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA
Dr. Stephen J. Blank
Strategic Studies Institute
There exists an extensive literature on the strategic importance of the Black Sea zone.
Yet it is difficult to discern whether U.S. policymakers are pursuing a coherent strategy
for this crucial region. Although Kyrgyzstan is in Central Asia, an adjoining region,
events there are symptomatic of this strategic challenge. Not only did our embassy in
Kyrgyzstan repeat the mistake the United States made in Iran by being excessively
attached to the reigning government and insufficiently attuned to other opposing sociopolitical groups, its actions during the April 2009 upheaval were inadequate, even
though it had forewarning of that event. Public reporting now confirms that the leaders
of the April revolution in Kyrgyzstan confided to the embassy that a successful
uprising, that would catapult a transitional government into the leadership of the
country, was imminent. Yet the embassy reacted ineffectually and apparently did not
alert Washington to the information it was provided. As a result, a revolution that bore
the visible fingerprints of Russian incitement and Moscow’s employment of diplomatic,
economic, informational, and even military instruments of power, overthrew the
Bakiyev government before the United States could intervene effectively.
The upshot of this is not only the embarrassment of U.S. inaction, and the ensuing
revelations of potential involvement in the Bakiyev regime’s corruption. The U.S. base
in Manas is now at some risk, not necessarily from the new Kyrgyz government, but
from Russia, upon who the new government depends and who has never hidden its
ambition of ousting the United States from Central Asia and the vital Manas base.
A similar incoherence afflicts our policy towards Azerbaijan. When Turkey
launched its reconciliation with Armenia it failed to raise the issue of NagornoKarabakh, the unresolved war between Armenia and Turkey’s protégé, Azerbaijan.
When Baku promptly protested vociferously the U.S. administration announced that
Armeno-Turkish normalization had nothing to do with this war, a position that is
difficult to justify on any strategic basis. When this is added to the fact that there has
been no ambassador in Baku for 9 months and the U.S. administration only submitted
the name of its new appointee to Congress for approval on May 21, 2010, it appears that
we have had a significant policy lapse regarding Azerbaijan. The Azeri government
believes that the United States is also stigmatizing it because of its corruption and anti-

democratic nature (that typifies the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] but
was not a barrier in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to U.S. friendship). Making matters
worse, the administration failed to invite President Aliyev to the nuclear summit while
inviting Armenian President Sargsyan, and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan.
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the Azeri government has
launched an anti-American media campaign, warned that the relationship hangs in the
balance, and that prominent Azeri experts warn that the United States could lose
Azerbaijan to Russia. Baku has already suspended a scheduled joint military drill with
U.S. forces, and is selling oil and gas to Iran in part to keep Iran from interfering in
Azeri domestic affairs. Azerbaijan is also the subject of a strong Russian campaign to
buy its gas, reintegrate it with Russia and the CIS, and thus kill the Nabucco pipeline
which is the only real European and Central Asian alternative to Russian energy
domination of Eurasia. Azerbaijan could also, if it chose to do so, interfere with
overflights of U.S. supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan, adding more pressure to a
potentially stressed lifeline through Manas. Thus, Azerbaijan possesses considerable
strategic importance, a fact that makes our inattention to it all the more inexplicable.
Similarly in Ukraine, the U.S. reaction to Russia’s deal ensuring that the Black Sea
Fleet stays in Ukraine through 2042 with an option for 5 more years was tepid. This deal
not only essentially mortgaged Ukraine’s sovereignty over the key Crimean Peninsula,
it also confirmed its energy dependence on Russia, and confirmed the refusal of the
current government to adopt the Westernizing and market-based reforms that alone
could have projected Ukraine to its alleged priority of European Union (EU)
membership. Now Russia has offered to take over its entire energy industry, gas, oil,
and nuclear power to relieve it from its energy crisis, a move that amounts to a
leveraged buyout of Ukraine and one that integrates it wholly with the Russian
economy.
This outcome already represents a disaster for Ukraine because it has bartered its
sovereignty for temporary economic relief which will not last long as there is no
incentive for it to reform its past policies. Should Ukraine accept Russia’s newest offer,
it will become a wholly owned Russian subsidiary, geopolitically speaking. Apart from
the loss of Ukrainian sovereignty, this means an end to the possibility of not only
NATO but also EU membership for Kyiv and an end to the idea of a Europe whole and
free, the real legacy of the end of the Cold War.
The recrudescence of a Russian empire not only restores bipolarity to Europe and
beyond, it means more pressure on Ukraine’s and Russia’s neighbors in Europe and
Asia, more pressure by Moscow to fracture European and trans-Atlantic unity, the
imposition of Russian energy dominance upon Eastern Europe with a consequent
magnification of Russian capabilities and efforts to subvert and undermine pro-Western
regimes there. This outcome entails the end of Nabucco and any possibility of escaping
Russian energy dominance and, in its geopolitical sum total, represents a major victory
for Russia at the expense of Ukraine and the West.
Yet all we could say is that Ukraine’s initial deal with Russia represented a
balancing act of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych between Russia and the West,
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and that the deal therefore makes sense. Perhaps the administration thinks that by
involving itself in the affairs of “small” states near Russia, it only asks for trouble from
Moscow and incurs the onus of dealing with the fruitless outcomes of unresolved
domestic quarrels and/or frozen ethnic conflicts. Perhaps it thinks that a “benign
neglect” of these areas is desirable for other, undisclosed reasons. Yet this absence of a
strategy and of a policy only disheartens pro-Western forces and regimes while
strengthening Russia and its desire to revise the legacy of the post-Cold War settlement.
Such revisionism only validates territorial land grabs at the expense of small states by
applying unremitting pressure upon them, through the subversion of their democratic
governments, and it fosters the revival of bipolarity and enhanced strategic rivalry in
Europe. Whatever else the extensive strategic literature on the Black Sea teaches us, it
surely teaches us that where a vacuum is created due to neglect, inattention, or any
other reason, someone else, often a hostile power, will fill it at the expense of those who
live there and their protectors, because nature abhors a vacuum. Alternatively, we
might also say that this literature teaches us that the Black Sea, strategically speaking, is
a “sacred area,” for as the Russian proverb states, “a sacred space is never empty.” If we
do not fill this space, Moscow will and in a manner that conflicts with our and our
allies’ interests. This literature and its associated history provide yet another lesson for
the Black Sea zone. The real question is, are we reading that literature, hearkening to
that history, or understanding what is taking place before our eyes?
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